Toppling the Iranian Regime: A Possible Mission?

Even before the war, Israel knew it was embarking on an operation that might only delay the Iranian nuclear project by a few years (still not a trivial matter). Therefore, many argue that Israel's goal should be the overthrow of the Iranian regime. Indeed, the fall of the Iranian regime would be a kind of a “magic bullet” to many of the regional challenges, but one must develop a healthy skepticism regarding its feasibility. At the same time, there is no reason not to take several steps that would increase the probability of such a scenario.

Why are the chances of toppling the Iranian regime isn’t high? 

Firstly, the trauma of the US and British involvement in the 1950s coup, which restored the Shah's rule, is seared into the Iranian collective memory. From photos common on the internet from 1970s Iran, one might think that the Shah's Iran was a happy, hipster, progressive, and liberal place. But the truth is that the overthrow of the elected Prime Minister Mosaddegh and the rise of the Shah is perceived in Iran as a traumatic event that destroyed democracy and led to decades of oppression. The 1979 revolution was led by a broad coalition that included Muslim clerics, leftists, communists, students, social activists, capitalists, and secular elements – all united against the oppression, corruption, and pro-Western policies of the Shah. Only after the Shah's fall did the gradual takeover by Islamist forces, led by Ayatollah Khomeini, occur. Despite the unpopularity of the current regime, it is not perceived as a 'foreign entity' and it's not inconceivable that it is still popular among many segments of Iranian society.

Secondly, history teaches that for a revolution to succeed, it needs to know how to leverage popular protest to win over the security forces to its side. For example, Mubarak fell only after the army decided to stand with the people and oust him. Similarly, the reason the Maduro regime in Venezuela still continues, even though you can't even get toilet paper in stores there anymore, is because the army did not side with the demonstrators. The challenge in Iran: The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). This body was established by the regime first and foremost to protect it from within, even in the face of a possible challenge from the army and police forces, as was the case with Mosaddegh. The absolute loyalty of the members of the Guards is ensured by ideology and economic interests.

Thirdly, the regime has established a sophisticated system of oppression and control that includes extensive technological surveillance; and the judicial system, whose central role appears to be to instill fear in opponents of the regime. These mechanisms make any attempt to challenge the regime difficult, and they succeed in suppressing protests before they reach a critical mass.

Finally, the chances of a revolution's success in Iran are also low due to the weakness of the opposition, which lacks a dominant figure who could lead the diverse and different groups in the Iranian population. In this context, the Israeli government's embrace of the Shah's son (Minister Gamliel hosted him on a well-publicized visit to Israel a few months ago) does not serve the goal and may even harm it, as he is not a popular figure and represents antagonism even among opponents of the current regime.

All of this shows that the chance of effective external involvement leading to a revolution is not high. And yet, Israel can act to increase the probability that such a possibility will occur, without developing expectations. Firstly, striking the economic sources of the IRGC and symbols of the regime may weaken them and spur dormant oppositional elements. There is no reason not to conduct psychological warfare that highlights the personal corruption and tyranny of the senior leadership in Iran, the strategic folly of the regime's policy of funding regional proxies, and the growing division and distrust between the IRGC and the army. All of these must be accompanied by economic pressure in coordination with the U.S. and other international actors. Israel can and should support the diverse opposition to the regime in any way it can, and perhaps even act to bring about breakouts from prisons where political prisoners who oppose the regime are held. Lastly, Israel can fund and develop technologies that can help activists inside Iran to organize, share information, and bypass the regime's internet blockades and surveillance.

The chances of realizing a regime-change scenario are not high, and therefore it should not be a declared objective of the government (because otherwise, its non-achievement could be considered an Israeli failure). However, it certainly can and should be an undeclared objective, as it holds the potential for enormous gain for Israel and the world.