The Hostage Deal and the Ceasefire

As the first (and likely last) stage of the Trump Plan begins to be implemented and the hostages return home, the question of whether the agreement constitutes an Israeli victory takes center stage in public discourse - while the mechanism to prevent Hamas’s renewed militarization remains unclear. It is doubtful whether a single Gazan truly believes that Hamas won this war. In any case, that debate, while intriguing, is not the main issue. What really matters is which long-term trends this war will set in motion - especially in the challenging period that will follow Trump.

While the IDF has achieved remarkable success across the seven fronts on which it fought in what has been Israel’s most complex war ever, Israel’s fundamental failure lies in the chronic lack of synchronization between military action and political strategy. Victory in war depends far more on the trends that develop afterward than on the results on the battlefield. The ultimate example is the First Lebanon War: the IDF achieved a clear military victory - PLO forces were expelled from Beirut, the Syrian army was defeated, and Lebanon’s newly elected president, Bashir Gemayel, signed a peace agreement with Israel. Yet within a very short time Gemayel was assassinated, Syria cunningly seized control of Lebanon, and Hezbollah gradually became the most powerful terrorist organization in the world. The same lesson applies to today’s campaign in Gaza: even though Israel’s military results are clearly positive, they tell us little about “what comes next.”

This connects directly to concerns about the day after Trump. The American president entered his second term determined to dismantle the liberal world order established under U.S. leadership after World War II—an order based on international institutions, shared norms, and costly American maintenance. His assertive foreign policy currently serves Israel’s interests, given the chronic anti-Israeli bias of international bodies. The challenge is that Trump’s emerging new order is temporary and relies almost entirely on his personal charisma and leadership. Only Trump could have turned Turkey and Qatar against Hamas (the true reason the agreement became possible) while simultaneously signaling Israel where to stop. Therefore, once Trump leaves the stage in November 2028, the future of the emerging arrangements, balances, and restraints embedded in this agreement will be highly uncertain.

Israel could thus find itself, the day after Trump, with a completely "internationlized" Gaza, “stuck” with Turkey present in there and equipped with F-35s; with Qatar—protected by a U.S. defense pact—deeply involved in the region; with an confrontational Egyptian regime; and all this without effective American restraint and within a lawless international order—a situation that historically benefits radical actors. The emerging partial agreement will likely severely restrict Israel’s freedom of action and prevent it from applying in Gaza the “Lebanon model” designed to curb Hamas’s rearmament. Added to all this is a huge question mark over the future of U.S.–Israel relations, as younger generations in America drift away from Israel—leaving Israel’s national security outlook increasingly uncertain.

The good news is that despite the diplomatic tsunami, Israel still holds better cards than Hamas and the “axis of resistance” when it comes to shaping regional realities in a way that could convert battlefield victories into strategic advantage. The bad news is that the government’s diplomatic performance so far raises deep concern about Israel’s capabilities in this arena. Netanyahu is probably the most talented spokesperson Israel has ever had—but PR or Hasbara are not the problem. The international isolation Israel now faces under his watch was not inevitable.

The current “soft war” is over the post-battle trends. Israel entered this campaign already facing international isolation, and having become the defining foreign-policy wedge issue across Western democracies. All eyes are on Israel. The more effectively Israel can translate its military gains into diplomatic achievements—chiefly by expanding the Abraham Accords—the better positioned it will be to counter the delegitimization it faces in the West, which will continue to challenge it for the foreseeable future.

The future challenges are worrying. Yet it is also a time to remember that all living hostages are returning home, and that Israel’s geo-strategic position today is stronger than it was under Iran’s “ring of fire” encirclement. The half-full glass, in this case, is indeed a whole world unto itself.