What Will the Historic Attack in Iran Bring?
- 2 days ago
- 3 min read
The remarkable achievement of the Israeli-American opening strike resonates precisely because this war did not break out as a surprise. There was no Iranian miscalculation here; in Tehran, they understood very well that the possibility of a military campaign was real. The late Khamenei appointed Ali Larijani to be responsible for maintaining the regime's stability in the event he was eliminated. The reason Iran

did not surrender is tied to a combination of theology and honor. Although the timing was tricky, the Iranian regime's inability to prevent the anticipated attack or to protect its senior officials from it exposes its impotence.
This is a historic event of massive proportions that makes the world a better place, but not everyone shares this view. Various elements in the West choose to emphasize 'American aggression,' and once again claims are heard that Israel dragged the U.S. into a war that is not its own. Progressive circles in the U.S., who remained silent in the face of the massacre of tens of thousands of civilians by the Iranian regime, are now coming out against the military campaign. They are joined by Republican isolationists, who attack President Trump for not keeping his promise to avoid wars. Both groups ignore the fact that the regime in Tehran inscribed on its banner the war against the U.S. and Western civilization as a whole. 'Death to America' was a common slogan. The regime has been developing nuclear weapons and long-range missiles—weapons already capable of striking Europe today, and planned to reach the U.S. in the future. The Iranian axis has already proven how it exploits its control over the chokepoints of the global economy, whether directly in the Strait of Hormuz or indirectly through its Houthi proxies in the Bab-el-Mandeb, to advance its interests and ideology. In addition to all this, Iran is the one enabling Russia to continue its war in Ukraine through a steady supply of UAVs.
The destruction of the State of Israel was a core interest for the regime in Tehran. It was not merely wishful thinking, but an orderly operational plan that relied on activating proxies across the Middle East, primarily Hamas and Hezbollah. Israel, without a doubt, had a clear interest in striking a blow to the Iranian regime and enlisting the strongest power in the world for this purpose. However, the Trump administration was wise enough to recognize striking Iran primarily as an American and global interest.
The main question that remains open is what the 'new' Iran will look like on the day after. Even though the fighting itself will end without the regime falling immediately, its collapse could be a byproduct of the internal trends that will develop in its wake. Two main possible scenarios:
The most likely scenario is that the identity of the next leadership in Tehran will be decided in a struggle between the conservative camp and the pro-regime reformists—a struggle in which it is difficult to assess the balance of power today. However, even if the conservatives gain the upper hand, it is likely that Iran's policies will be significantly restrained following Khamenei's death, given the total ideological collapse of the revolutionary export strategy.
Another possible and parallel scenario is the flaring up of an armed struggle by separatist minorities—Kurds, Baluchis, Arabs, Turkmen, Lurs, and even Azeris (Khamenei's own father is of Azeri descent)—against the central government. Such a multi-front uprising could lead to Tehran's loss of governance and control across the country.
The road to regime change is still long. Here in Israel, we rightfully focus on the extraordinary images of joyous celebrations in Iran over Khamenei's death, but on the Telegram channels of regime supporters, one sees many more Iranians taking to the streets to protest his killing. Obviously, it is easier for them to go out and protest, but the regime still enjoys considerable support among many in Iran for ideological and religious reasons, and it is entirely possible that an attack by external forces actually unites many Iranians around it. Furthermore, the regime still possesses effective internal security mechanisms, whose vulnerability to airstrikes is limited. Importing unsentimental Shiite militias from Iraq, for example, is a particularly effective defensive wall.
Where do we go from here? It will not be a long war. Although the Iranian strategy against Israel is based on an endless war of attrition, this strategy has backfired on Iran. What began as a seven-front war forced upon Israel has turned into a war that Iran is waging against eight countries. Iran has neither the capability nor the interest to drag out this war, especially when its honor is trampled daily as enemy planes circle over Tehran, and certainly when its proxy organizations—built specifically for this moment—once again fail to deliver the goods. This is nothing less than the dawn of a new day in the Middle East.




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