The Iranian Paradox and the Lebanon Trap

1. Iran has lost this war. So why is there no sense of victory?

By any objective measure, Iran is suffering a crushing defeat: its leadership has been decapitated, its naval and air branches decimated, its missile project dealt a lethal blow, and its nuclear program significantly set back. Under the shadow of the Trump administration, the prospects for a near-term nuclear recovery are non-existent.

The paradox, however, is that an Iranian defeat does not automatically translate into an Israeli-American victory. President Trump’s recent statements suggest that Washington has already internalized a sobering reality: the Iranian regime will not collapse as long as the war persists. The same realization is dawning in Jerusalem.

The Americans need a "victory image" to facilitate an exit, while the Iranians are determined to respond with humiliation. Without a diplomatic "acrobat's formula" that allows both sides to save face, the war will continue; but if such a formula is found, the end may be closer than it seems.

2. Hezbollah: The Risk of Rehabilitation and the Image of Power

In the previous round, after 11 days of Hezbollah taking devastating blows, Netanyahu was right to halt the war just before it entered a chronic phase of stagnation—the point where the "marginal utility" of each day of combat begins to drop. Hezbollah was not crushed—that was never truly on the table—but the rules of the game shifted heavily against them. Despite the immense suffering in northern Israel, Hezbollah was far from realizing the doomsday scenarios for which Israel had prepared.

The problem is that we began the current round against Hezbollah from the same point of stagnation where the last one concluded. While Hezbollah initiated the current escalation, its senior leadership exploited the initial "grace period" to disappear into bunkers. The result? Limited military achievements on the Israeli side and a heavy sense of dread regarding "the day after."

The primary threat is that Hezbollah may emerge from this conflict with an enhanced image of power. If the new rules of engagement do not allow Israel to actively enforce a ceasefire, and we find ourselves relying once again on international "guarantees" or hollow promises from the Lebanese government, we have accomplished nothing.

Hezbollah relies heavily (though not exclusively) on Iran, highlighting another flawed Israeli "conception": the idea that an Iranian collapse will trigger a Hezbollah collapse. In reality, the organization operates an independent economic empire, controlling international drug trafficking routes in South America. It is capable of self-rehabilitation even with diminished Iranian support—unless the fundamental equation is changed.

3. The Houthis: "Waiting for the Iranian Command?"

The analytical discourse attempting to predict when Iran will "give the order" to the Houthis to escalate suffers from a fundamental misunderstanding. The Houthis' commitment to Iran is significantly lower than their ideological commitment to the Palestinian cause. As Zaydi Shiites (a sect distinct from Iran’s Twelver Shiism), they do not owe blind religious obedience to the Supreme Leader in Tehran.

An interesting fact often overlooked: during the 12-day war with Iran in June 2025, the Houthis did not fire at Israel at all—the longest such period since October 7th until the ceasefire with Hamas. They resumed fire only days after that specific conflict ended. The Houthis may eventually join the war, but it certainly won't be contingent on a delayed Iranian "order," as various "experts" claim.

In Short

Iran has lost this war, even if the regime itself survives (as we assessed on day one). The "Export of the Revolution" strategy has ideologically collapsed, and we are likely to see a more restrained Tehran, even if the hardliners prevail in their upcoming struggle against pro-regime reformists.

However, an Israeli strategic victory remains in doubt: if Hezbollah ends this campaign with the upper hand in terms of public perception, we may find ourselves in a paradoxical situation—we defeated Iran (yet to happen), but we lost Lebanon. Quiet in the North will not be decided in Isfahan, but in Israel’s ability to shape a new reality in Beirut and Southern Lebanon.