The Exit Conundrum

Countries may be able to control the conditions under which they initia

te a war, but it is far more difficult for them to control the conditions of its conclusion. As long as the Strait of Hormuz remained open and functional, Israel and the US had a reasonable exit point. The situation could become even more complicated if the Houthis decide to enter the campaign. Continuing the war carries a heavy price, but stopping it under the current conditions also carries an unbearable cost.

In Israel and the US, there is currently discussion of two endgame scenarios that are not realistic at this stage:

The first scenario: “the good agreement”

In this scenario, the war ends with a “good agreement” - one that ensures freedom of navigation in Hormuz, dismantles the Iranian nuclear project, severely damages the missile program, and restores regional stability. Such an agreement is not feasible, because it would amount to Iranian surrender, at a time when the leading consideration there is the preservation of national and religious honor. Thus, every reasonable American exit point becomes a target for Iranian obstruction.

In the previous war between Israel and Iran (Operation 'Am KeLavi', June 2025), the fact that Israeli aircraft operated without interference in Iranian airspace was perceived as a national humiliation, and therefore the regime was determined to cut its losses and agreed to a ceasefire. Now, insofar as America is unable to impose its will, standing up to it in itself is perceived as a path toward restoring national honor.

Another reason why an agreement is not possible is that there is no real address. Trump proudly stated that the US has no idea whom to speak with in light of the elimination of the leadership, but the implication is that there is no single Iranian actor who possesses legitimacy, authority, and the capability to impose a strategic move. The decentralization and chaos in Iranian conduct are the implementation of the contingency plan the former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei initiated in the event of his assassination. Such conduct does not allow for decision-making based on compromise at all. Thus, while Iran’s president Pezeshkian issues calming statements, reality shows that he has no real control over events.

The second scenario: regime collapse

Already on the first day of the war, we wrote that the war would not end with the fall of the regime, though that could be a delayed consequence of the war. Although in Israel the focus is on the public expressions of joy by Iranians over the blows suffered by the regime, it is more likely that an external attack actually consolidates even critical elements around the regime. Popular revolutions are never the consequence of external bombardment (as oppose to coups).

And this is the American-Israeli paradox: revolutions do not begin when the skies are burning, but in fact when the fire subsides, when fear is replaced by rage, and when the public stops feeling that it is under external attack and begins turning its gaze inward. The question is what the optimal endpoint is for accelerating such processes. The longer the war drags on, the more the regime may actually improve its chances of survival because it reorganizes, projects presence, rebuilds mechanisms of control, and demonstrates resilience in the face of the strongest power in the world, all while the citizens are worn down.

It is important to understand that both Israel and the US entered the war out of clear national security interests, but not necessarily identical ones. For Israel, after the opening blows of the first two weeks, the marginal benefit of each additional day of war declines. For the Americans, by contrast, the story is far broader than the nuclear issue, missile programs, and the threat posed by proxies; it is also tied to the global economy, maritime insurance costs, energy prices, the balance of power vis-à-vis China, American credibility with its allies, and even Trump’s political legacy. At this stage, Israel has already lost, to a large extent, the ability to create an independent exit point for itself, and it is highly dependent on the US.

What is the possible endgame scenario?

So if there is no agreement, and no immediate collapse of the regime, there will probably be no “utopian” ending of the kind Israel and the US would like to see. An exit strategy must therefore be formulated that will optimally accelerate positive long-term trends. These trends are connected to Iran’s ability to rehabilitate its missile project, nuclear program, and proxies; and to weakening the regime’s internal coercive mechanisms and its image of power. Instead of a utopian ending to which senior figures in Israel and the US aspire, perhaps what is needed is a positive functional ending. Not a Hollywood-style victory, but the strategic engineering of an environment in which the regime may survive in the short term, but is historically weakened.

In light of the current deadlock, one may expect the Strait of Hormuz to be reopened either through the deployment of American ground forces or through an agreement that would amount to an American climbdown. Our bet is that we will see another forceful escalated American action, one that may even include a limited deployment of forces on the ground. This is not risk-free scenario, but it is far more realistic than the fantasy scenarios the West is selling itself: there will be no Iranian surrender agreement, and there will be no popular revolution under fire.