Situation Assessment: Passover Edition

Between National Security and Personal Security: A Bittersweet Plate of Charoset and Maror

Israel has never had an officially written national security doctrine, but its core principles have been passed down as an oral tradition. David Ben-Gurion understood that Israel could not decisively defeat its enemies across such a vast region, and adopted Jabotinsky's Iron Wall concept, which assumed Israel would live by the sword until its enemies would lose faith in their ability to destroy it, until the next round. In pre-active, the essence of Israeli security doctrine: to buy time between rounds.

Even before the war has ended, one can argue that from a national security standpoint, Israel is in a better position. In June 2025, Iran was a nuclear threshold state. Even if the nuclear program is rebuildable, Israel succeeded in this war in buying itself more time. The guns are still firing, but Israel has dismantled the existential threat posed by Iran and its proxies. Israel now enjoys a close relationship with the world's number one power, and its contribution in combat has been that of an equal partner. Israeli strength also radiates a deterrent effect on other potential adversaries in the region. From a national perspective, the missile fire on Israel, for all its difficulty, constitutes a tactical problem, not an existential threat.

The issue is that in Israel, national security and personal security do not always go hand in hand. Despite Israel having the best civil defense in the world, consisting of multiple layers of interceptors, an impressive deployment of public shelters and safe rooms, an unprecedented readiness of hospitals for emergency conditions, and more — none of this consoles citizens who run to shelters day after day and have been living on a war footing for two and a half years. Despite the Hezbollah threat being only a pale shadow of what was anticipated, life for residents of the North is unbearable. Even so, most polls show that Israelis are no longer rushing to purchase fleeting calm and the illusion of personal security, as they did for years with Hamas.

The End of the War: Dayenu?

Understanding that Israel cannot decisively defeat its enemies across the region, Netanyahu knew how to end the wars against Iran in July 2025 and against Hezbollah in October 2024 before they descended into chronic stagnation, where the marginal benefit of each additional day of fighting diminishes. In the current round, Israel has lost the ability to end the war on its own terms — it is managed entirely from Washington, which has considerations far broader than Israel's. Israel is effectively a partner in the first AI war, not only in the sense of unprecedented use of AI-based weaponry, but primarily in the American effort to secure access to the rare-earth materials and energy required for global dominance in the AI competition with China. This is an agenda far wider than Israel's, which, as noted, is primarily seeking to buy itself time.

Following the July round, assessments in Israel held that another war with Iran was inevitable. But all signs, including several leaks, indicate that it was the United States that set the timing, earlier than Israel would have preferred. Israel had an interest in striking Iran, but despite the raging American narrative that Israel dragged the U.S. into a war with Iran, in some measure the reverse was true.

Idol Worship: The Return of Sectarian Politics and Corruption

After October 7th, the war served as a temporary dam against polarization and sectarian politics. Now, while soldiers are in the trenches and reservists and entire families bear the security, economic, and civilian burden, the government is granting sweeping draft exemptions and funneling sectarian funds to the ultra-Orthodox. These moves dismantle Israeli solidarity and reward sectarian leadership that perpetuates dependency, insularity, and draft evasion. A government that trades truth for the altar of power risks unraveling Israeli society from within.