National Resilience in Days of Polarization

This is the executive summary of Astarta/Atchalta’s new policy paper, National Resilience in Days of Polarization: A Compass and Operating System for the Zionist Alliance. The paper has been distributed in recent weeks to senior Israeli officials, politicians, and civil society leaders, and will serve as the conceptual framework for our work in the field of social cohesion. 

We encourage you to read the full paper.

IN A NUTSHELL

This document focuses on a specific dimension of national resilience: the ongoing willingness of Israelis, as individuals and as communities, to carry the burden, to strive, to fight, and to make sacrifices for the State of Israel. This willingness cannot rely on legislation alone; it requires a sense of ownership and belonging to the state, social solidarity, and a conviction that the state reflects the moral world of its citizens.

There is no viable option for either side to prevail, and any attempt to subdue the other will lead to mutual collapse. In such a system, whoever seeks to “win” will ultimately find themselves standing on the ruins of our homeland. The choice facing Israel is not between right and left, but between a sober awakening and total disintegration driven by identity politics and polarization.

However, this document does not attempt to market futile “healing governments” or cosmetic unity built on whitewashing disagreements or pursuing an empty consensus. The repair proposed here requires groundbreaking leadership with the courage to exact a price for separatism and the determination to establish new rules of the game—demanding a level of national maturity that confronts our complex reality head-on.

WHAT IS THE CHALLENGE?

Israel is a victim of identity politics. Polarization has transformed the terms “right” and “left” into markers of emotionally charged identity packages that directly contradict one another, setting conservatism and Jewishness against liberalism and democracy. The Mapai Mamlachti-era and the “melting pot” model—intended to create a “new Israeli”—is perceived by many as a mechanism designed to preserve secular-liberal hegemony at the expense of tradition and customs, prioritizing legal and technocratic procedure over emotion and heritage. In the eyes of many, the judicial system is not a neutral gatekeeper, but rather an executive arm of the Mamlachti-liberal tribe, seeking to shape the public sphere in its own image.

In recent years, this perception has accelerated the formation of an alliance of various groups united against the existing order, turning the public sphere into a chronic arena of inter-sectoral combat. Religious Zionism, despite being at the forefront of bearing the burden, has tied a Gordian knot specifically with the Haredim, whose loyalty lies with “Da’at Torah” (rabbinic authority) rather than the civic contract. The government’s attempts to enact the “judicial reform” / “judicial revolution” touched every exposed nerve in Israeli society. The struggle over the existing order has escalated from an ideological debate into a profound emotional and cognitive polarization that undermines public order and the rule of law, threatening to hollow out the “Israeli story.”

Thus, the conceptual framework of the State of Israel as Jewish and democratic has been caught in a pincer movement: parts of the Right have drifted away from values at the core of liberal democracy, while parts of the Left have developed an estrangement from their Jewish roots. This dynamic effectively hollows out the Mamlachti center and consumes the space of shared consensus.

October 7th exposed the collapse of the “covenant of fate,” as the Haredi refusal to carry the burden during a moment of existential test—while sitting in the government—represented a betrayal of the Israeli collective’s basic contract.

As if this were not enough, in the course of our work we reached several conclusions that make the tangle even more complex:

1. There is no doubt that the change Israel needs is radical; however, any government is liable to prove too weak to enact the structural changes requiring extensive legislative effort and thus incapable of leading this change—even assuming it were interested in doing so.

2. Attempting to establish a constitution carries inherent danger, as it could force Israel into an imaginary “moment of truth” at a time when it lacks the maturity to navigate it successfully. The almost certain failure of such a move could signal that the Israeli experiment has failed. 

3. The required change demands a blend of courageous leadership and a genuine effort to forge broad consensus—yet such consensus must not become the ultimate goal, as it will not lead to fundamental change and will instead serve as a recipe for conceptual paralysis.

 

OUR VISION

The vision we advance consists of three pillars:

PILLAR 1: A ZIONIST ALLIANCE OF THE SERVING PUBLIC - Building Power and Infrastructure for a New Kind of Mamlachtiyut

The Zionist Alliance is a political and social concept of a broad coalition of Zionist forces—Jewish, democratic, and liberal—that seeks to break the traditional bloc divisions and establish a new Zionist partnership centered on Israel’s identity as the nation-state of the Jewish people and as a modern, liberal state.

Its core principle is substantive equality in carrying the burden, but with a broader definition of the “serving public”: anyone who carries the weight of the state’s existence through defense and service, productive participation in the workforce, or civic engagement.

The political expression of this alliance: a “Neo-Mamlachti” bloc in the Knesset, spanning across coalition and opposition lines. Zionist parties will view themselves as obligated to exercise a moral and practical veto over sectoral extortion and tribal legislation.

Such a bloc will tie the allocation of state resources—beyond basic fundamental rights—to the degree of burden-sharing, the restoration of the state’s monopoly on the law, and the strengthening of state institutions, alongside a commitment to ensuring representation for all groups in the country. The bloc will embody a politics of leadership, at either the factional or individual Knesset member level, prepared to exact a price for separatism and for privileges that are not accompanied by responsibility.

The social expression of the Zionist Alliance is the creation of a new ethos of civic engagement. It establishes a shared language of national responsibility and good citizenship, capable of bridging diverse groups by constructing a shared conceptual tier above them. This represents a modern, voluntary “melting pot”—one that does not seek to replicate the old hegemony or demand cultural uniformity, but rather aims to ground a practical and emotional commitment to the shared Zionist enterprise.

PILLAR 2: INCLUSION OF MINORITIES BASED ON FUNCTIONAL PARTNERSHIP

The Zionist Alliance must open its doors to non-Zionist groups, provided they are willing to accept the rules of the game of Israeli democracy. To promote an Israel that is “inclusive of all its citizens,” we propose several conceptual frameworks:

Distinction Between Civic Equality and Community Privileges: Civic equality is granted to all unconditionally, whereas community privileges are conditioned on carrying the burden. The state must provide full basic rights without condition to every citizen, while simultaneously establishing a clear link between community privileges and the degree of integration, contribution, and responsibility of their members. The guiding principle is “one hand pushes away, while the other draws near”—setting clear boundaries against sectoral extortion and privileges without responsibility, alongside creating pathways for integration for every community.

Empowerment of Local Leadership, Even Without Decentralization of Powers: Rather than allowing every dispute over religion, education, or infrastructure to escalate into a national crisis in Jerusalem, local authorities, communities, and regions should be enabled to manage a larger share of their lives in accordance with the unique demographic diversity of their residents. However, because attempts to promote legislation for the decentralization of authority have not succeeded—and it is doubtful whether they can be advanced—practical tools must be developed to empower local leadership based on what we term “soft local power,” which consists of several components:

Power Based on Semi-Formal Authorities, Not Necessarily Knesset Legislation: Examples of such non-formal authorities include local procedures, residual powers, municipal bylaws, norms, and especially the involvement of Diaspora Jewry. For instance, Diaspora Jewry can serve as a neutral mediator between different groups, as Diaspora communities already have existing resources flowing directly to local authorities and regional clusters that actively promote models of “civic engagement” and shared burden-bearing. We at Atchalta are currently developing a model on this topic and will present it soon.

Artificial Intelligence as a Catalyst for National Resilience: Artificial intelligence can become a tool that expands opportunities, improves training, enables the measurement of trust and belonging, identifies hotspots of polarization, and serves as an instrument for designing inclusive policy. Preparing for the AI era is not merely a technological issue, but an integral part of national resilience policy, social cohesion, and the Zionist Alliance.

Conceptual and practical pathways must be paved for each tribe to assume its circle of responsibility. For example:

• For the Ultra-Orthodox (Haredim): A trajectory of “Mamlachti Haredim” that bears civic responsibility through employment, core curriculum studies, and tailored service.

• For Arab Citizens of Israel: An invitation to partnership in building the state as citizens with equal rights and duties—integration into decision-making centers, employment, civic service, and local and national leadership—all without requiring Zionist identification or declarations of loyalty, but with the clear expectation of renouncement of Israel’s enemies and radical Islam.

• For Religious Zionism: Reinforcing the movement that views service, national unity, and upholding the law and democracy as an integral part of its religious and national commitment.

• For the Mamlachti-Liberal Public: Protecting the distinctiveness of state education, strengthening Jewish pluralism, and rebuilding a service and community ethos that extends beyond protest or the mere defense of individual lifestyle choices.

PILLAR 3: A PUBLIC SPHERE DEDICATED TO JUDAISM AND PEOPLEHOOD

The Zionist Alliance requires a renewed connection—both emotional and cognitive—of Israeli society to its Jewish roots and to Diaspora Jewry. The negation of the Diaspora (Shlilat HaGalut) in the state’s early days, alongside handing the “keys to Judaism” over to the Rabbinate and the Orthodox establishment, created deep alienation among many Israelis toward their own Jewishness. This effectively transformed Israel from the nation-state of the entire Jewish people into a state whose sole purpose is to serve its citizens alone. Consequently, the dimension of shared destiny was eroded, weakening one of the central sources of resilience in Israeli society.

Ironically, a vivid, creative, and profound Jewish-cultural renaissance is occurring in Israel—spanning music, literature, plastic arts, theater, dance, cinema, and sports—yet it takes place outside the institutional domain. Today, the connection between religion and state causes many to associate Judaism with regulation and coercion. Attempts to reinforce the Jewish component in the public sphere are almost immediately labeled as “religification” (Hadata) and fail to become a unifying resource for identity, responsibility, and mutual accountability.

The paranoid reaction of parts of the public in this context does not necessarily mean “they aren’t actually being pursued,” as state-promoted content often carries a conservative, reactionary, and political Orthodox character. All of these factors contribute to a missed opportunity: leveraging the rebirth of Jewish culture to tighten social cohesion, reconnect Israelis to broader Jewish culture, and instill a sense of responsibility toward the entire Jewish people.

The required correction is “More Judaism—Less Coercion” (see the “Restart for Judaism” document cited in the sources for this paper): active state responsibility for cultivating Jewish culture, language, calendar, heritage, and peoplehood, alongside dismantling the state-backed Orthodox monopoly over religious services and introducing multiple tracks under uniform regulation.

The goal is not to weaken Judaism in the public sphere, but to liberate it from its association with coercion and sectoral mechanisms, transforming it once again into a shared cultural and national asset for secular, traditional, religious, Ultra-Orthodox, and Diaspora Jews alike.

To this end, a deep Jewish reform is also required within the education system. State education must cultivate a multidimensional and pluralistic Jewish identity, encompassing significant engagement with Jewish heritage and the history of Diaspora Jewry. The aim of this initiative is to heal the alienation felt by sections of the public toward their cultural roots, and to instill a renewed sense of belonging to the broader Jewish people—not solely to the state.

Finally, a new practical meaning must be given to Israel’s status as the nation-state of the entire Jewish people. A public sphere dedicated to peoplehood must be established, where the connection to Diaspora Jewry is not a ceremonial or diplomatic appendix, but an everyday component of identity, culture, policy, and national resilience.

THE ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM: THE CONFLICT WITH THE PALESTINIANS

The Palestinian issue has transformed from a political disagreement into an internal polarization engine, shaping the boundaries of belonging and legitimacy within Israeli society. At one extreme lies an approach seeking annexation—that is, complete overlap between Israel’s legal sovereignty and its practical sovereignty across the entire area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea. At the other extreme stands an approach advocating a total end to Israeli control over the Palestinians.

Between these two poles operate four primary rationales:

• A Pragmatic-Security Rationale: Fearing that any withdrawal will create another base for terrorism—a position historically associated with the Right. Following October 7th, this perspective appears to have become widely accepted across broad segments of the political spectrum.

• A Pragmatic-Political Rationale: Viewing continued control as a threat to Israel’s legitimacy, morality, and demographics—a position historically associated with the Left.

• An Ideological Rationale from the Right: Striving to apply sovereignty over all parts of the Land of Israel as the ancestral heritage of the Jewish people.

• An Ideological Rationale from the Left: Emphasizing the rights of Palestinians to freedom and self-determination.

The gap between Israel’s practical sovereignty and the territory over which it applies its legal sovereignty serves as a “mirroring engine” for the damages of Israeli tribalism. Israel exercises practical security, economic, and civil control over the space between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea, yet applies its legal sovereignty only to “Israel proper” within the 1967 borders.

This gap between practical and legal sovereignty exposes parallel realities, in which each tribe holds a fundamentally different perspective on core issues: the nature of the framework of loyalty, the self-perception of the sector’s contribution to the common good, the role of the state, and the basic attitude toward it. This diversity does not converge into a shared national story, but instead generates a cacophony of conflicting narratives.

The result is that Israel manages the central conflict of its existence through tactical responses, risk management, and de-escalation, but without an agreed-upon vision, a shared public language, or a broad national decision. This vacuum produces an “authority chaos”: a governmental twilight zone where authority and responsibility do not overlap, enforcement is partial and selective, and judicial intervention consequently becomes frequent, effectively replacing structured policy. Thus, trust in state institutions erodes, and the public sphere turns into an arena of action for ideological fringe groups.

This document does not advocate for a specific solution, but it is clear to us that any alternative must preserve the two foundational pillars of Zionism: the Jewish-national component and the democratic-liberal component.

Therefore, a forward-looking Zionist-sovereign approach is required: managing the issue in a manner that preserves maneuvering room for the next generation, reduces security risks, minimizes moral erosion, enables resistance to international criticism and delegitimization, and establishes greater alignment between authority and responsibility—while eradicating ideologically motivated crimes and ensuring equal enforcement of the law for all.