Mansour Abbas’s Model: Better Than the Haredi Model

Ra'am leader Mansour Abbas agreed to the unification of the Arab parties on the condition that each party could act independently after the elections, which would potentially allow him to join a coalition separately. The issue of Ra'am is a litmus test for Israel's ability to contain a civic partnership with the Arab minority. The ideological connection to the "Muslim Brotherhood" remains a heavy weight, and investigations have raised disturbing questions regarding the connection of an organization associated with Ra'am to elements identified with Hamas. The suspicion after October 7th is healthy and justified, yet it must not turn into an automatic negation of groups that agree to play by the Zionist rules of the game.

The one who paved the way for Abbas's legitimacy was actually Netanyahu, who, in his courting of Ra'am's votes, broke the long-standing right-wing taboo on cooperation with the Islamic Movement. His successors in the "Government of Change" already turned this into a historical precedent: Ra'am voted in favor of the state and security budgets, during a period when the Likud opposed them from the opposition, and even stayed in the coalition during a military operation in Gaza. Abbas defined himself as a "proud Arab Muslim and an Israeli citizen," and in doing so, marked a direction of influence through partnership, rather than protest from the outside.

The best proof of the change led by Abbas is in the Palestinian criticism. The PLO, the Palestinian Authority, the High Follow-Up Committee for Arab Citizens of Israel, Hadash, Balad, and Ta'al – all perceive Abbas as someone who has turned his back on Palestinian nationalism. Without a doubt, Abbas’s most bitter rival is Hamas, whose leaders attack Abbas and Ra'am in language that frames them as traitors and collaborators.

However, the 2026 election campaign has returned Abbas to the position of the "outcast." Even when he announced that Ra'am would separate from the Shura Council and establish independent institutions, Abbas received the cold shoulder. Thus, Liberman claimed it was uninteresting, Gantz declared that Israel would not depend on any Arab party "not nearby and not approximately," and Bennett strictly rules out the possibility of partnership with the Arab parties.

Mansour Abbas does not offer a liberal revolution and is therefore not in the pocket of the opposition, but rather he offers to refine the Haredi model: a transition from an ideological struggle over the character of the state to a sectoral-pragmatic approach. The Haredi public built high walls to protect its identity but knew how to become a central player in the distribution of resources – a model that has become unhealthy for Israel because it sanctifies separatism and exemption from the burden. Abbas offers the opposite deal: instead of money for segregation, he asks for budgets for integration. He understands that for the model to work, the state must agree to accept "citizenship without Zionism" – exactly as it behaves toward the Haredim – but on the condition that the partnership be based on civic responsibility and a shared burden, not on privileges. When a citizen reaches out and says "I am part of the state," and the state refuses to shake it only because he is not a Zionist, it misses an opportunity to turn the sectoral model from a burden on society into an engine of growth and partnership.

Israel must break free from the urge for categorical disqualification of Arab society and learn to "accept a yes" from those willing to act within the Zionist rules of the game. A sober perception must be adopted that distinguishes between the adoption of Zionism and the acceptance of the state framework. To weaken separatist trends, the state must ensure that the pragmatic path is the most profitable and rewarded track; only in this way will integration become an attractive alternative that strengthens national resilience. This is the essence of functional civic partnership.

It is possible that the suspicion toward Abbas is justified, but the risk in partnership is marginal compared to the danger of exclusion. There is also the question of the alternative. Excluding a fifth of the population from the democratic game is not a policy, but a certain recipe for internal explosion. The integration of those willing to accept the rules of the game is a national interest and the only way to ensure long-term social stability. The hour has come for Israel to learn to accept "yes."