What Will Israel's National Security Look Like Without American Backing?

Originally published in Hebrew in Makor Rishon (see Hebrew)

Israel needs to begin preparing for the day when the United States is no longer its special ally. Time magazine's revelation that Israel was running a paid influence campaign in the United States, operated by the Israeli Foreign Ministry, is a crisis on the scale of the Pollard affair. U.S. Vice President Vance attacked the campaign sharply, charging that Israel is trying to drag America into an escalation with Iran.

Last week Trump announced that he would move forward with the sale of F-35 to Turkey, over Israel's objections. Within the Democratic Party, of course, the picture is considerably worse: 103 Democratic members of Congress voted to cut off American aid to Israel. Even the collapse of the U.S.–Iran deal, one negotiated over Israel's head, cannot obscure the message: we are witnessing the end of the "special relationship" between the two countries.

From the outset, Israel's national security doctrine assigned particular importance to a strategic bond with a great power. In the early years, up until the Six-Day War, that power was France; since then it has been the United States. The "special relationship" that developed between Israel and America included, among other things, American economic and military assistance (steadily reduced over time until what remains today is a military aid grant alone), preservation of Israel's qualitative military edge, deep military cooperation including joint weapons development, operational coordination, mutual intelligence sharing, and even coordination on Israel's policy of nuclear ambiguity. Even so, until recently Israel remained independent in its decisions and faithful to the principle of defending itself by itself.

No other power can supply the quality of relationship or the benefits that the United States provides Israel, and no "cocktail" of several powers can substitute for it either, not that anyone is lining up for the job. In a world returning to realpolitik, Israel currently has a great deal to sell on the strength of its power. What remains unclear is how much of that reputation for strength will survive without full American backing.

The central strategic question that ought to be troubling the heads of the defense establishment is this: what does Israel's national security look like without the United States?

Israel is likely to live within the permanent tension between the need to act on the passive principle of self-protection, known by its poetic name, "a villa in the jungle", and the principle of prevention, under which it acts proactively to thwart emerging threats. On its face, the lesson of October 7 demands constant proactive friction. But that path risks dragging Israel into a chronic war of attrition, accompanied by international isolation, shortages of munitions and weapons systems, and this time without Washington's full support and without sufficient manpower.

Israel has the tools to adapt its warfighting doctrine to the changing landscape. The IDF's superiority derives not only from its technological edge but above all from its human capital, its spirit and its creativity. Major General Israel Tal ("Talik") once said that "the man in the tank will win." Even in a world of advanced technology and hardware, the decisive advantage on the battlefield rests on fighting spirit, resourcefulness and the quality of the soldiers, and of these the IDF has plenty (the spirit, that is, not the number of soldiers required). One assumes that planning work on the domestic production of munitions and spare parts is already underway within the defense establishment. It is a complex undertaking, but ultimately a technical one.

Wars are measured by the trends they set in motion and by their political outcomes. An important lesson from the current campaign against Iran is that battlefield superiority does not always translate into those trends and outcomes. Reality therefore demands the development of a doctrine, tools and capabilities of soft power. In the new environment, Israel must build capacities that will allow it, for example, to broaden and deepen ties with states and groups in the region; to mount a coordinated economic, informational and diplomatic campaign against Iran, and perhaps against Turkey as well; to formulate an approach toward the new actors shaping the geostrategic landscape, among them technology and artificial intelligence companies; and to develop resilience and endurance grounded in social cohesion and in an aspiration toward a fairer sharing of the burden. Above all, Israel must wean itself off the simplistic notion that its problem in the international arena is a public diplomacy problem, and must avoid entanglement in campaigns like the one exposed this week.

It may be that the scenario of an Israel without America will not fully materialize, and it may be that even if it does, it will unfold gradually. But national strategy is not built on hope; it is built on preparation. A responsible state does not ask how to preserve the old order, but how to secure itself when that order changes. If the era of the "special relationship" is indeed drawing to a close, Israel's great challenge is not merely to produce more tanks, munitions or defense systems, but to shape a new national security doctrine, one resting on military strength, internal resilience, diplomatic influence, and the ability to operate in a world where no one is more committed to its security than it is itself.