How Can Israel Both Defeat Hamas and Seize the Regional Opportunity?

Atchalta is a supporter, and its founder is a member of the "Coalition for Regional Security," which promotes a new regional order in the Middle East that will serve as an iron wall against the Iranian threat and its proxies - for the sake of Israel’s security.

The economic agreements signed in Riyadh are just the tip of the iceberg in the formation of a new regional order - one that Israel is not part of, but certainly can and should be.

After a year and a half of fighting, especially one intense week and a half in September, Israel collapsed the Iranian axis and shifted the regional balance of power. Backed by the strongest power in the world, Israel began to feel and act like a regional power and sought to reshape the Middle East.

And yet, in recent days, a dramatic new regional order is emerging without Israel, under the auspices of the American administration. The most significant shift is the dissolution of the rivalry over regional hegemony between the Islamist axis led by Qatar and Turkey, and the pro-Western axis led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Instead of competing over outposts abandoned by the pro-Iranian axis in Syria and Lebanon, these two blocs are now cooperating there with American encouragement.

Thus, this week saw a scene that would have been unimaginable in the past: an American president meeting with a Syrian president, previously associated with a group linked to Al-Qaeda that carried out the 9/11 attacks, in the presence of the Saudi crown prince and his bitter rival from the Khashoggi affair, the president of Turkey.

Israel’s exclusion by the United States stems from an American realization that it is now Israel, not the Arab states, that constitutes the main obstacle to advancing regional integration. When the Trump administration embraced Israel, it could boast of achieving peace “from a position of strength,” even without territorial concessions. Today, that same administration is choosing to advance regional integration without Israel. The power is now America’s, not Israel’s, and it is using it forcefully to promote its interests, sentiment-free.

Israel’s sense of bitterness is only growing as the American administration leaves it to deal alone with the Houthis, begins direct talks with Iran about its nuclear project, and even engages directly with Hamas ‘over Israel’s head’ leading to the release of kidnapped soldier Edan Alexander. In the background looms the question of the “great gift” Trump reportedly promised Hamas in exchange for the soldier’s release. At this point, it seems even less likely that Trump would jeopardize the Riyadh achievements by advancing the Gaza emigration plan he proposed several months ago.

All of this converges on a decisive week, in which negotiations will be held in Doha over a ceasefire and the release of hostages. A failure in these talks could signal a more aggressive resumption of Israel’s ground maneuver in Gaza. The U.S. has made it clear it would like to see the war end, but it is not forcing its will on Israel -and is even providing the tools needed to implement whatever decision Israel makes. The decision is Israel’s - and so are the responsibility and consequences.

The Israeli government has received an invitation to be part of the new regional order—but it comes at a political price. Given the current public atmosphere and the current government makeup, it is doubtful whether Israel can renew its commitment to a political process or the two-state principle. Furthermore, ending the fighting now would mean that the goal of toppling Hamas in Gaza has not been achieved. Yet it must be remembered that there is no certainty Israel will achieve its objectives in Gaza or that the cost of doing so won’t be too high - socially, diplomatically, and in terms of security. Israel may well end up losing on all fronts.

Victory in war depends far more on the trends that emerge afterward than on the immediate battlefield outcomes. Therefore, Israel must ask itself: what trends does it seek to set in motion that would represent true victory, and what is the optimal way to achieve them?

If the results of a war initiated by Hamas include: Israel’s integration into the region, including normalization with Saudi Arabia; its inclusion in a land trade route alternative to the Suez Canal; the formation of a U.S.-backed regional axis against Iran; Israel’s ability to influence the terms for Gaza’s reconstruction by Gulf states; its transformation into a hub for AI investment - the centerpiece of Trump’s visit; and the return of the hostages home, then it will be clear that Israel achieved a sweeping victory in a regional war launched against it on seven fronts. As we already wrote in June 2024, see: "Blinken's Outline: Is There Another Way to Win the War?".

 Even in the most optimistic scenarios, Israel will not be able to achieve such outcomes through continued warfare.